The Brussels Brief

1. Introduction

After the 2004-2007 Big Bang enlargement, the topic has returned to the EU agenda, as has the interest in this issue. Years of enlargement fatigue, with a slow accession process of opening of negotiating chapters and almost seldom closing any, have now given way to a potential new Big(ger) Bang enlargement wave as early as 2030. This will not come without challenge. The current group is eclectic, geographically and historically. Some candidate countries originated in the bloody Balkans wars from the 1990s. Others are fighting Russian aggression now, with Russia occupying parts of the country. Some still have frozen conflicts on their territories.

Many of the challenges the EU had to handle in 2004-2007 are similar for the next wave. As the spectrum of Ukraine’s accession, a large country currently fighting a bitter war against Russia’s aggression, looms, budgetary and institutional issues remain the main concerns. As previously, the EU will need to undertake its own internal reforms that will increase its absorption capacity and make it capable of accepting new members. The EU needs to go through this reform process and complete it in parallel to the accession process for candidate countries and by the time of their eventual future accession[1].

This article proposes a comparison of the previous wave of EU enlargement in 2004-2007 and a potential future one. Understanding the drivers and possible limits of EU enlargement is necessary to place a future accession process in a larger context. As such, the article looks primarily at the motivation for EU enlargement, presenting both utilitarian and constructivist drivers. Looking at the past large wave of enlargement, the article emphasises benefits and costs, as well as arguments linked to the EU identity of aspiring countries. Current literature looks particularly at Ukraine and the challenges that its accession would bring to the EU. This article brings a comparative perspective with the previous large wave of enlargement, as well as an insight into the potential limits of EU accession.

2. Logics of EU Enlargement: A Study of the 2004-2007 Big Bang

To understand motivations behind EU enlargement, it is relevant to examine drivers that led to the different waves of EU enlargement and to know why member states made this decision on various occasions. Understanding why the EU has enlarged in the past helps explain whether and how it will continue. From a rational institutionalist, utilitarian perspective, the examination of economic, political, security, and governance benefits and costs for the EU of adding new member states is key. Indeed, Piedrafita and Torreblanca’s study on the logic of enlargement looks at enlargement from three different perspectives, with differentiating motivations in each case[2]. According to these authors, from a rational institutionalist perspective, the EU enlargement policy can be seen as a policy aimed at maximising utility, meaning a maximisation of economic and security preferences. From this perspective, EU enlargement aims at political, strategic and economic gains while minimising overall costs for the EU. Moravcsik and Vachudova show that each of the existing member states aims, during the enlargement phases, to maximise its own share of these gains while minimising its contribution to the costs associated with a particular enlargement[3].

Taking a rational liberal intergovernmental approach, Moravcsik and Vachudova counter any idealistic explanations when looking at the 2004 wave of enlargement. Their research indicates that “interstate idealism never seems as powerfully professed as when it runs parallel to material self-interest”[4]. Moravcsik and Vachudova underscore that, under a cost-benefit analysis, the cost that the EU15 incurred with the fifth wave of enlargement was more limited than believed, mainly because agricultural and industrial trade had been previously partially liberalised. At the same time, the fifth wave of enlargement was also about gaining roughly 100 million citizens as new customers and full access to markets developing at an accelerated rate with growing purchasing power[5].

In terms of the political benefits, these relate primarily to how the enlargement of the EU translates into giving the EU more political weight in the world, including from a regional perspective. This can be qualitatively analysed in terms of what adding a large new member, with a strong influence in a particular region, may mean to the overall global political influence of the EU. At the same time, the increased political weight can also be analysed from a more complex perspective, for example, the degree to which enlarging, particularly to remaining regions of the continent, limits or balances other foreign influences in these regions. Moravcsik and Vachudova argue that the Eastern enlargement meant consistent gains in terms of political clout for the EU, better control of illegal immigration and geopolitical stabilisation, all arguments favouring the material self-interest of EU15[6]. This is in line with Baldwin and Portes, who conducted a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits for both Central European candidates and EU15, and who, in the introduction of their study, point, also with a view of applying it to other future waves of enlargement, to one key motivation of eastern enlargement: “geopolitical considerations constitute the engine driving enlargement”[7]. In other words, one of the motivations for Eastern enlargement was to ensure Western European influence, in a very comprehensive meaning, ranging from governance to economic influence, to a region in Europe that had just emerged from decades of Communist rule and whose path had to be shaped before other powers, rivalling the EU, would extend their influence.

Additional concrete political benefits for Western Europe, as highlighted by Sedelmeier’s writing post-eastern enlargement, include reducing the gap in democratic quality and standards between East and West and alignment with the acquis, a critical condition for accession[8].

The comprehensive study by Baldwin, Francois and Portes points to additional benefits of eastern enlargement for EU15, such as a less risky environment in Central and Eastern Europe for investors from Western Europe and lower risks of inflationary spurts. Their model estimates the benefits for the West to be 11.2 billion Euros, of which Germany would receive around 33.8%, France 19.3% and the UK 14.1%. In terms of economic benefits, a comparative analysis usually focuses on three elements – the GDP, the population size, and the real per capita GDP[9]. As Baldwin et al. showed, an analysis of differences between EU populations and the population of potential future members, as well as in terms of the relative size of the economies, is crucial because it showcases whether integration of a new member provides opportunities for EU economic operators[10]. One can expect that the smaller the GDP, the size of the population and the GDP per capita compared to the EU average, the smaller the opportunities for the EU operators in the potential new member state are. Similarly, more opportunities result from a candidate country with a bigger economy, reflected in a higher GDP, mainly if this is a diversified economy[11].

Regarding costs, Wohlgemuth and Brandi argue that the increased heterogeneity that came with the enlargement of the EU should be viewed as something other than a problem. In their view, this heterogeneity created several benefits that resulted from the internal market, such as, for example, “a more efficient division of labour”[12]. The problem that they did see was that enlargement and, as a consequence, heterogeneity due to enlargement could potentially lower the positive impact of several policies at the EU level. These could no longer be targeted, and the member states had a different capacity for integration. To mitigate this, they argue for flexible integration, with each member state being given the option of choosing the rights and obligations stemming from various policies, in line with the type of multispeed Europe or the model of concentric integration[13]. This is an idea that has been more and more explored within the EU, including through a joint French-German report that proposes this type of strategic approach towards both future enlargement and intra-EU policy integration.  

In terms of political costs, there are also institutional costs that can be associated with further enlargement. They imply a more complicated decision-making process despite the continuous adjustments that have been made to ensure greater EU functionality. The voting mechanism can also be influenced by some of the candidates or potential candidates becoming members in the future. A more cumbersome decision-making process and the possibility of stalemates in this process is a significant political cost. This is reflected in Laermans and Roosens, who showed that decision-making was a potential problem with EU enlargement. The marginal cost of enlarging included a more complex decision-making process, resulting from more member states. The Treaty of Lisbon, however, introduced clauses related to the voting process, including a wider use of the qualified majority. In principle, this would make the decision process more efficient and, thus, would shift the marginal cost curve to the right, allowing an increase in the optimum number of members[14]. 

Summing up the utility-maximisation perspective of eastern enlargement, Piedrafita and Torreblanca[15] emphasised that this amounted to economic and political reforms for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which translated into concrete benefits for existing member states. These were implemented using the “carrot” of eventual accession and increased this region’s competitiveness and economic strength, making it an asset for EU15 and the EU a stronger global actor. However, the benefits of EU15 included additional markets integrated into the Single Market, with legislation aligned to the EU acquis, providing investment opportunities for EU15. The eastern enlargement increased the EU’s political clout as a global power. It helped, through integration, to bring this region of Europe out of potential foreign influences, consolidating these new member states as part of the EU. There were clear and significant security, economic and political benefits for the EU15 due to the CEE enlargement[16].

At the same time, the constructivist perspective focuses on the EU imposing structures, values, norms and ways of doing things, which candidate countries and potential future member states acknowledge and implement. The governance model that the EU proposes implies a gradual but significant transfer of sovereignty to Brussels and the European institutions. The accession process for a new country that wants to join the EU starts with a background analysis performed by the European Commission. This background analysis takes into consideration two elements, as reflected in art. 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). According to this, “any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union” (Treaty on European Union 2016). Some key-shared values for EU member states and candidates are listed in Art. 2[17] of the TEU. Moreover, even before they apply for membership, candidate countries need to embrace the values codified as the Copenhagen Criteria. EU eligibility criteria, as defined by the Copenhagen Criteria, include stable institutions, functioning market criteria, and the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership. These are fundamental shared values and objectives of the EU, with the aim (as criterion 3 of the Copenhagen Criteria proved) of building a shared future. Many EU shared values have been codified into shared EU norms, reflected in the EU Treaties and secondary legislation. Candidate countries would need to implement these EU norms to a degree that would make them functional member states upon accession. The more significant number of shared norms forming the EU identity induced the EU to use a variety of instruments, including assistance programs, to build this identity before a new candidate would join.

However, while these elements argue in favour or against further expansion, there are clear limits to the EU enlargement that the theory of clubs aims to explain. The optimum size of the EU is understood as the number of member states for which the marginal utility is the greatest, namely for which the marginal benefit is larger than the marginal cost of enlargement. Wohlgemuth and Brandi translate the theory of clubs to the EU. Considering the EU a club, they aim to answer three primary questions: who were the members of the club, what kind of club goods did they produce and share within the club and what kind of costs and benefits were associated with these goods within the club in terms of providing and consuming them. Furthermore, they aim to understand better what characteristics the optimal club size would have[18].

They define the EU as a club of 25 Member States^[19], although one could also see the EU as having 500 million members (the citizens of the EU), represented by 25 agents, namely the governments of the member states. The goods provided by the club included the guarantee of the “Four Freedoms” (free movement of goods, services, persons and capital), product standardisation, EU-level regulation, police and judicial collaboration, coordination in various policies, etc.[20]. Wohlgemuth and Brandi argue that these goods have the main characteristics of club goods, namely, they are non-rival (if a member state benefited from the good, this did not reduce benefits for the other Member states. This is arguable and probably more realistic to state that these club goods were partially non-rival. The rivalry has been clear in some cases, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or the structural and cohesion funds. The goods were only available for the EU club members; third states did not have access to these[21].

In terms of club benefits, costs and optimal club size, Wohlgemuth and Brandi look at three club goods, aiming to analyse benefits and costs for the member states and the optimal number of club members[22]. These three club goods were the Internal Market Club, the Economic and Monetary Union Club and the Common Agricultural Club[23]. The benefits of the internal market were clear. Additional members would increase these benefits because of a larger market and increased competition that would give way to permanent economic growth. However, decision-making costs would increase and, as such, the optimal club size would still be finite[24].

Benefits of the Economic and Monetary Union club include economies of scale, intensified competition and general welfare gains. Costs were related to information, organisation and decision-making. One could also consider external costs, since the members gave up on their monetary policy and exchange rate policy. This could show that the costs of expanding this club were also high and increased with the number of members. The authors conclude that the optimal club size for the EMU was smaller than that of the internal market. The authors also point out that, in their opinion, the Common Agricultural Policy was a harmful policy that should have an optimal club size of zero[25].

The theory of clubs can be used to determine (1) the impact of EU enlargement in terms of internal and external costs and (2) potential ways to mitigate these costs with deeper integration, translating, as previously shown, into a shift of the cost curve to the right, allowing a new optimum number of members. Wohlgemuth and Brandi discuss the following main points on the implications of a larger and more heterogeneous EU:

3. Considerations Regarding the Next Big(ger) Bang

(1) decision-making costs were higher in larger units with more heterogeneous populations. This was logical because more member states would also mean a more significant and less homogenous EU population with more differentiated interests and objectives. Beyond the common EU interest, some of the member states would focus more on particular policies, this being reflected in the decision-making process in the Council;

(2) external costs were higher in a more heterogeneous EU. Citing Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Wohlgemuth and Brandi defined external costs as “the costs that the individual expects to endure as a result of the actions of others over which he has no direct control”[26]. External costs in the case of the EU were higher in a larger EU because “a larger number of people having to live with a centralised decision made on the EU-level of policy-making which does not comply with their order of preferences”[27].

Following these assumptions, Wohlgemuth and Brandi point out that decision-making costs could be mitigated by a less inclusive decision-making process, for example, using qualified majority voting rather than unanimity voting in several areas. In a qualified majority, some member states could vote against the decision but still have to accept the final result. A trade-off exists between decision-making costs and external costs: when one decreases, the other increases. Wohlgemuth and Brandi put the two costs in balance, rhetorically seeing how lowering decision-making costs would help the declared purpose of the Union to be “closer to the citizens”[28]. The idea of an expansion of qualified voting to most or all of the areas of decision-making in the EU has been further discussed more recently, particularly in view of the institutional changes needed in the EU to allow for further enlargement, among them, in 2023, by a Franco-German working group on EU institutional reform[29]. 

On the lines of mitigating enlargement costs with further enlargement, Wohlgemuth and Brandi discuss the concept of flexible integration, proposing several categories of models, namely multi-speed, concentric circles and a la carte. Multi-speed integration refers to the type of integration whereby leader states would integrate faster, with the other states reaching the same level of integration later on. Multi-speed integration offers a lag time for those states that cannot integrate at the same speed, but this type of exemption is only temporary and exceptional. All states need to integrate at the same level over time eventually.

Over the current enlargement process looms the war that Russia has launched against Ukraine. All other aspects are arguable; the acceleration of the accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova is a direct consequence of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. While the benefit of increased security reflected the argument that enlargement worked as an export of stability towards the EU neighbourhood, at present, enlargement has become a security necessity for the EU. It is, indeed, a “primarily geopolitical tool”[30] rather than “an instrument to advance European values and rules for their own sake”. If previously, enlargement would assist EU security through an export of values and rules and, as such, of stability to new regions, this has now shifted to a more classical security provision through geopolitical instrumentation. Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has understood enlargement as an “expansion into strategically important regions”[31]. Russia will likely remain Europe’s biggest security challenge shortly, and Ukraine is the primary security provider for Europe[32].  At the same time, beyond this security challenge, the EU has also understood the need to be the most important geopolitical actor in its neighbourhood, at risk, otherwise, to see foreign influence take over that role in areas such as the Western Balkans.

Clearly, the first particularity that needs to be discussed is the security situation in the country. The war that Russia has launched against Ukraine looms over the entire process of the accession negotiations. While all other aspects are arguable, the acceleration of the accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova is a direct consequence of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. While the benefit of increased security reflected the argument that enlargement worked as an export of stability towards the EU neighbourhood, at present, enlargement has become a security necessity for the EU. It is, indeed, a “primarily geopolitical tool”[33] rather than “an instrument to advance European values and rules for their own sake”. If previously, enlargement would assist EU security through an export of values and rules and, as such, of stability to new regions, this has now shifted to a more classical security provision through geopolitical instrumentation. Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has understood enlargement as an “expansion into strategically important regions”[34]. That said, Russia will likely remain Europe’s biggest security challenge shortly, and Ukraine is the primary security provider for Europe[35].  At the same time, beyond this security challenge, the EU has also understood the need to be the most important geopolitical actor in its neighbourhood, at risk, otherwise, to see foreign influence take over that role in areas such as the Western Balkans.

However, the security situation is a clear particularity, as well as a challenge, in Ukraine’s accession process. There are several subsequent issues that derive from this situation. The war is ongoing. It has never happened in the history of EU enlargement waves that one of the candidate countries has an ongoing war on its territory. In fact, during the 1990s, accession countries were required to conduct and complete treaties of good relations with its neighbours. Romania, for example, signed such as treaty with Ukraine in 1997, referred to as the “Treaty on the Relations of Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation between Romania and Ukraine”[36]. Similar to other candidate countries of the period, Romania signed similar treaties with all its neighbours. The EU intention was clear, namely not to allow the future member states to import bilateral issues into the Union. At the present, the EU has the same preoccupations. The focus has been on the Western Balkans, where, aspects such as name issues, border demarcations or the Serbia-Kosovo issue (to name just a few) threaten to bring bilateral disputes into the EU accession process. Everything else put aside, the truth remains that the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine was undertaken during a war on this candidate country’s territory, an aggression that, at the moment, has no ending in sight and no perspective as to how this ending will look like. For the EU and its enlargement policy, it brings about legitimate questions as to how to address this candidate country’s specificity and how to factor in the ongoing aggression (as well as the post-war reconstruction process) into the accession process.

For some of these particularities, the EU has already put forward specific solutions and instruments. For example, as regards the reconstruction process, the EU has adopted the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated financing instrument proposed by the Commission to provide coherent, flexible and predictable support to Ukraine for the period 2024-2027. Its three main pillars aim to provide direct budget support to the Ukrainian government conditioned to reforms, to catalyse private investment and to provide technical assistance to public authorities and civil society to prepare for EU accession. This instrument has thus being customised to take into account the specific mentioned particularity. More similar solutions will need to customise existing financing instruments in order to ensure both reconstruction and the financial support throughout the accession process.

A resulting element that needs to be considered as regards the security situation is what this will eventually translate into and what the endgame will look like. It is not the object of this book to speculate in this direction. However, it will analyse as to one of the possible scenarios, namely the fact that frozen conflicts could remain in some of the Ukrainian regions, areas where the government will not exercise effective control. Fortunately, the EU already has such an example from its previous enlargement waves, but it will be difficult to assess whether and, particularly, how the respective model could be successfully replicated to Ukraine. The example is that of Cyprus, which joined as a member state in 2004. The central government does not exercise effective control over the northern part of its territory, where the so-called, unrecognised “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” has been created (and recognised solely by Türkyie, in 1983). The Annan Plan, submitted to a referendum in both the Greek and Turkish communities on the island and intended as a plan to reunite the island and ensure that it enters the EU as a united country, has been rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots are recognised as EU citizens and efforts are still undertaken to reunify the island. Several Commission Regulations are in place to ensure that EU aid supports the Turkish community and that, at some point in the future, upon reunification, the community would already be able to implement the EU acquis. The EU recognises solely the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law.

What may seem like elements off similarity are, however, miles apart. The regions of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporijia, occupied by Russia in Ukraine, have been annexed by Russia on 30 September 2022 (formalised on 5 October 2022). There is no ongoing process of reunification. Given the circumstances, one would have a very hard time believing that any such process would ever take place in the future, as would one have a hard time understanding any form of EU involvement in these regions where the Ukrainian central government would not exercise an effective control. This is clearly a different situation from that of Cyprus, where Türkyie has never undertaken annexation and where a process of reunification, along with instruments of reconciliation such as bilateral technical committees, has been ongoing for decades (despite periods of time when it stalled).

Circumscribed to the issue of good neighbourly relations is also the issue of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, which should not be underestimated, particularly since it has already proven a difficulty in the accession process. Figures vary, but, while the Russian minority is somewhere around 17 %, other national minorities include the Romanian, Hungarian, Polish or Moldovan ones. In December 2022, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a new law on national minorities that, among other things, limited the use of minority languages in school. This prompted immediate reactions from the President of Romania, as well as from the Hungarian Prime Minister. The law was also criticised by the minorities of Ukraine, EU member states and NGOs, to the degree to which the Venice Commission issued an opinion, including a set of recommendations to improve the law. Following these recommendations, an amendment was adopted on 23 August 2023, and President Zelensky signed it into force on 3 November 2023. This topic will remain in continuous focus throughout the accession process. The negotiating framework (more on this further below) includes, in paragraph 40, a reference to the need for Ukraine to adopt, in an inclusive process, an “Action Plan dedicated to the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities” (Negotiating Framework, 2024). The issue of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities will also figure as one or more of the interim benchmarks in the Draft Common Position for chapter 23.

The Ukrainian government will need to solve, throughout its accession process, the dichotomy between the need to adopt legislation and implement measures to consolidate the state and, at the same time, be able to address all the concerns of neighbouring countries with regards to their minorities, as reflected in international legal frameworks. This challenge will not necessarily be easy to handle, as the initial adoption of the law on national minorities in 2022 showed. The first reaction of the government was to adopt legislation that limited the rights of people belonging to national minorities, in part because of the association made between the Russian aggression and the Russian minority in the east. Only upon the reaction of the international community and because of the pressures related to the accession process, the legislation was subsequently amended.

With the exception of Hungary, which constantly opposed Ukraine’s accession process, as well as various financing packages to help the candidate country, including the Ukraine Facility, declaratively, all EU member states support the country’s EU accession negotiations. However, this political message comes with several nuances as regards the rhythm of the accession, the conditions that need to be met and the correlation between the accession path and the internal reforms that the EU needs to undertake in order to be able to integrate new member states, particularly one of the size and impact that Ukraine has. This section looks at several groups of member states and their influence on the rhythm of Ukraine’s accession negotiations.

First, we look at the large member states, such as Germany, France and Poland. Their position and active involvement in the negotiations will be crucial in order to ensure that the technical aspects of the process are efficiently handled, while, at the same time, respecting all criteria, especially the key focus on the fundamentals. For Germany, the dichotomy that the government needs to solve is between the clear geopolitical and moral motivations for Ukraine’s accession and the EU internal stress that such an enlargement will cause, in terms of economic and social aspects[37]. This, in turn, will also reverberate to Germany itself, as well as the other member states. Furthermore, while the geopolitical imperative calls for an accelerated accession process, Germany’s position remains that Ukraine needs to fulfil all conditionalities, particularly in the area of fundamentals, as any candidate would need to as well. These two elements are hard to settle together: reforms in the area of fundamentals take time to implement and the evaluation process within the EU is also a lengthy one, with member states having to agree at each step. The overall perception is also that, given the current conditions, it is more difficult to implement these reforms and, at the same time, that the starting point, particularly in areas such as the fight against corruption, is significantly lower than it has been with other previous candidates (to which one can also add the issue of a bigger country, bigger economy and, as such, bigger problems).

In line with the theoretical framework of liberal intergovernmentalism, Germany’s position also needs to strongly take into account internal politics and the nterests of various actors, which then create the national preference[38]. This is difficult to settle, between a Green Foreign Minister that advocates for an accelerated approach and stronger support and a Social-Democrat Prime Minister that has a functional, but difficult coalition and pressures from the extreme right and left, as seen in the regional elections various states in 2024. Mapping the compromise among all these positions and complications will not prove easy and will affect the rhythm of Ukraine’s accession process.

4. Conclusion

France, in turn, also needs to solve similar dichotomies and others as well. In the Franco-German couple, Germany has traditionally been a promoter of EU enlargement, while France was generally the more reticent partner. This reticence came from the perception that, at 27 members, the EU had to focus more on its internal reforms rather than on further integration. As such, it would need to first conduct these reforms before it progressed to a new wave of enlargement. In line with the policy of gradual integration, France was at the forefront of the new enlargement methodology that allowed candidate countries to join various programs and access the internal market as they completed various parts of the negotiations. This took away from the pressures of accelerated enlargement, since it provided benefits along the process. However, the approach changed gradually following the Russian aggression against Ukraine. President Macron’s speech in Bratislava, at the GLOBSEC Summit in June 2023, showcased this. It emphasized that, in fact, the aggression against Ukraine was “an extreme manifestation of a challenge to our European unity that has played out in the last 15 years, and a show of fragility”[39]. As such, the war against Ukraine was a threat to Europe’s own security, an expression of “Russian attempts to overturn the whole European security architecture, to reshape it in its own terms”[40]. To respond to this security threat, the EU would use the instrument in its arsenal, of which the enlargement policy was its strongest. The vision of a geopolitical Europe thus became clearer in France’s perception of the EU and this also explains its shift from a more traditionally sceptical approach towards EU enlargement.

At the same time, as in Germany’s case, considerations regarding the political scene in France are also important. In 2027, France will hold presidential and parliamentary elections. Ukraine’s EU accession process will also have a role in the path towards it and the political campaign that will shape it. These area considerations to take into account in the run-up, but, at the same time, one can also think about developments depending on the results of these elections. If Marine Le Pen wins, how would France’s policy towards enlargement (and an accelerated approach towards Ukraine) change? As previously in the case of Germany, France’s national position takes into account several components, not the least the way various entities contribute to the formation of national preferences.

As regards Poland, it has been one of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters since the war started, in terms of humanitarian and military assistance, as well as international advocacy[41]. Poland has received most Ukrainian refugees, and actively promoted the Ukrainian cause following the Russian aggression. It has called for strong international support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, traditionally, Poland has also been a supporter of a comprehensive EU approach towards the Eastern Neighbourhood, which eventually translated into the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). As a follow-up and with the aim of further consolidation and of encouraging EU accession aspirations, Poland and Sweden introduced the Eastern Partnership, which grouped Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, and which aimed at enhancing relations with these countries. Furthermore, Poland has continuously advocated for continuing the enlargement process to include countries in Eastern Europe and maintain the EU’s open door policy. All of these are arguments in favour of Poland’s support for Ukraine’s accession negotiations.

However, as with Germany and France, this support also has particularities that need to be adequately handled, as well as dichotomies that need to be solved. As mentioned, EU internal institutional reforms are needed, but Poland will be one of the member states that would find it most difficult to adjust to such changes such as qualified majority voting in key areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It will also find it difficult to adjust to budgetary changes that could lead to Poland being a net contributor, even this will, in principle, happen only many years from now. Historical issues, while solvable, as well as their internal political implications, will also play a role in determining the Polish support for the rhythm of negotiations.

We have discussed here the positions of some of the big member states. The common denominator seems to be that of a strong support, but with considerations that need to be adequately handled, both in terms of internal politics and EU reform processes. Other member states will raise, throughout the process, aspects that result from national preferences, as determined by internal actors. Ranging from the protection of rights of people belonging to national minorities to the protection of national farmers (and the volume of their EU funding), and from environmental issues to decision-making within the EU, the rhythm of Ukraine’s accession will depend both on the country’s own merits and the position of member states in the internal negotiations.

The potential implications and costs of a future enlargement are similar to those of the 2004-2007 wave. These can be divided into two large categories: budgetary and institutional costs. However, the observation is that, in 2004-2007, the EU’s enlargement took place for EU15, while now there are 27 member states. This will have implications regarding the internal adjustments and reforms that the EU must undertake to allow for the integration of the new members.

Regarding budgetary implications, the most pressing question for current members is how the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF, the EU’s budget) and the existing member states allocations for the various policies will need to change to accommodate the new members. In particular, the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy raise the most eyebrows, particularly regarding the accession of Ukraine, a country with a population of around 40 million inhabitants (total Western Balkans population amounts to around 17.6 million). Overall, according to various simulations[42], accession of these new members does not seem to change the configuration of contributors. Net contributors will remain so, as will net beneficiaries. The changes in additional contributions and decreased benefits for CEE countries are also not too large. While the cohesion policy will need to be adjusted so that the new members receive bigger allocations, current member states such as Poland and Romania have high economic growth rates. This means that, by the time Western Balkan partners, Ukraine or Moldova join, they would need less cohesion funds than at the moment. This is what had similarly happened in 2004-2007 when cohesion funding gradually shifted from recipients such as Portugal and Greece towards new member states.

Regarding the funds for agriculture, one needs to consider a potential 10-year transition period for direct payments, particularly after Ukraine’s accession. With that in mind, if the most optimistic timeframe for Ukraine’s accession is 2030, it will be at the earliest in 2040 that direct payments would start, a timeframe that will allow a better adjustment over the next MFFs. Preparations for the financial impact of Ukraine’s accession are also done through instruments such as the Ukraine Facility, a new EU-dedicated financing instrument proposed by the Commission to provide coherent, flexible and predictable support to Ukraine for 2024-2027. This instrument provides direct budget support to the Ukrainian government conditioned to reforms, catalyses private investment and provides technical assistance to public authorities and civil society to prepare for EU accession[43].

From an institutional point of view, the accession of new member states requires legal and political changes. Legally, each new member state will receive a Commissioner (although there are also evaluations concerning the possibility of a future 30+ member states Commission that does not abide by the one Member State-one Commissioner principle), and a proportionate number of MEPs will be included in the European Parliament. At the same time, from a political point of view, one of the major issues that the EU needs to solve is related to the decision-making process in the Council of the EU, particularly where unanimity is currently used, such as in aspects related to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or to EU’s enlargement policy. The EU and its member states must decide whether unanimity will remain the norm in these areas (as well as others, such as taxation or social security). A shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) has happened in the past, for example, with the Treaty of Lisbon. However, this may imply the need to change the EU Treaties with all related implications.

Moving to constructivist drivers for future EU enlargement, as linked to the 2004-2007 Eastern enlargement, Neumann suggests that, after the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the countries in Central Europe (Czechoslovakia at that time, Poland and Hungary) strongly argued that they would be frontrunners of the Eastern enlargement process also because their cultural, religious and historical identity was that of Western Europe. They distinguished themselves from Eastern Europe, and what was to become the Western Balkans in that they were a core part of Western European identity. To that, then-Eastern European states responded by presenting a broader set of norms and values reflecting a shared identity, linking it with the period of democracies in these countries between the two World Wars[44].

Neumann’s work on the topic of a European shared identity continues: in a speech given in Finland in 2006, subsequently transformed into a paper, he points out that “cultural boundaries of Europe are decidedly fuzzy”, as “collective identities are not homogenous, primarily because the differences between EU countries and immediate neighbours were not as great as implied. He argues that each state in Central and Eastern Europe supported their European identity by pointing out that they are more European than the immediate Eastern (or Southern) neighbours. He exemplifies this with the Baltic States and Romania on one side and Ukraine on the other.

The geographical criterion is clearly no longer the case in the current wave of enlargement. Beyond enlargement’s shift towards the East and the geopolitical consideration, a common European identity has become forged more by adherence to shared norms and values rather than geographical proximity to a centre. This is why Sjursen’s proposal that “norms constitute the identity of actors” is the appropriate approach towards building a constructivist argumentation of the next wave of EU enlargement. The current candidate countries, as previous candidate countries, will join “a value-based community and a rights-based post-national union”. The common European identity results from this framework of values, norms and rights. From this point of view, the new wave of enlargement moves away from the 2004-2007 wave by proposing a paradigm through which any state that respects the EU values and norms (as well as the known geographical criterion) can eventually join the EU.

The argumentation that Central and Eastern Europe had to join the EU because the continent’s artificial political and economic division had to be corrected has been further presented by Sjursen (2002). Discussing enlargement from a shared identity perspective, Sjursen proposes that “norms constitute the identity of actors” (2002), an approach that was the premise of her understanding of enlargement through the perspective of shared norms. Shared norms would shape the actors’ view of the world and their preferences for interaction with other actors. Sjursen presents the EU as “a value-based community and a rights-based post-national union” (2008, p. 2) but also as a problem-solving entity focused on solving problems that arise between the member states (pp. 1-5). Combining these two perceptions of a shared identity of the EU, Sjursen concludes that the shared identity as a motivation for enlargement has been both a consequence of Europe’s past and the will to correct the wrong from the past, and is closely linked to the commitment to fundamental values and universal principles. Without evaluating potential future expansions of the EU, Sjursen proposes an EU with a shared identity that combines the universal tenets and European particularities (Sjursen 2008, p. 11). 

This article presents a comparison of the current wave of EU Enlargement and the 2004-2007 one. Differences clearly exist between the two groups and the heterogeneity of the current candidates and the Russian aggression against Ukraine are two of the main ones. Another particularity is that the EU motivation has shifted from a primarily shared identity to a geopolitical driver. This has also become more security-inclined: the export of stability through values and norms is still an important component, but the need to represent a direct geopolitical actor in the immediate neighbourhood is now a priority.

The challenges, on the other hand, reflect some of the previous ones. The EU will still need to underscore internal reforms to accommodate new member states, just as it has in 2004, while the insurmountable budgetary and financial challenges will still be solved through an adequate allocation of funds between various policies and member states and a transition period, as needed. The EU dilemma to be solved remains one of (1) taking advantage of the benefits of enlargement, primarily geopolitical and security ones, while (2) reducing institutional and budgetary costs, through internal reform and, at the same time (3) maintaining an EU identity that is based on the existing norms and values, particularly through the necessary reforms in the candidate countries.

The flexible integration approach should not undermine these main pillars, but should allow, as proposed by the current enlargement methodology and the clusters-based strategy, a gradual integration of candidate countries in the Single Market throughout the accession process. This will consolidate the capacities of candidate countries, to both their benefit and the EU’s. Future research could follow dynamically the accession path of the current candidates and continue to map evolutions against the background of EU internal reforms in the mentioned areas.  

However, as we all know, Russia started and continued to use all instruments of pressure available to keep Ukraine in the Russian camp. These ranged from economic and commercial measures aimed at limiting the access of Ukrainian companies and products on the Russian market (and on the market of countries in the Customs Union) to outright military aggression in 2022. The motivation was always the same: retain Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence, be able to influence its decisions and limit the independence of its choices, refuse Ukraine’s right to determine its own path and its own appurtenance in international structures and organizations and, overall, limit its capacity to independently act.

The EU responded with a geopolitical approach to the enlargement process, a strategic policy that remains one of the Union’s most important and useful instruments. Ukraine applied for membership in 2022, almost immediately after the Russian aggression. Following the necessary bureaucratic and political steps in 2022 and 2023, the European Council politically validated, in December 2023, the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine. The negotiating framework was approved in June 2024, marking a continuation of the ongoing accession process for Ukraine. Cluster 1 was opened in June 2026.

In conclusion, where are we now? We remember that enlargement waves generally work in groups. There are exceptions to this rule, notably the accession of Croatia, in 2013, but, generally, the assumption is that two or more candidate countries join together. We have two main groups now. One group is formed of Western Balkans candidates. Here, Montenegro is the most advanced, with the ad-hoc Council Working Party potentially starting work on drafting the accession treaty soon. Albania follows, with good progress, while the others dragging along at different speeds and with different problems. Can one see a possible Montenegro-Albania tandem for the next wave to include some of the Western Balkans candidates? This is a potential idea, although Montenegro is more advanced and, as always, there is the constant problem of one candidate having to wait for the other.

Then, there is the other tandem Moldova-Ukraine, even more complicated given the state of continuous war of aggression in which Ukraine finds itself. Both countries have opened cluster 1, both have also pushed for the opening of all clusters and could move at a similar rhythm in the next year. At the same time, one needs to bring into discussion, in one of our future articles, the idea of “associate membership”, which France and Germany have vehiculated recently. Stopping short of full membership and not including voting rights would open a new, uncharted territory, with many dilemmas, while providing immediate benefits to these countries. A more detailed analysis of this approach will be reflect in one of our future commentaries.  

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[1] Among others P Buras, E Morina, ‘Catch-27: The Contradictory Thinking about Enlargement in the EU’(2024), < https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/> accessed 19 July 2024

[2] S Piedrafita, J Torreblanca, ‘The three logics of EU enlargement: interests, identities and arguments’ (2005) Politique Européenne, 2005 1/15.

[3] A Moravcsik, M.A. Vachudova, ‘National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement’ (2003) East European Politics and Societies 17/1.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] A Moravcsik, M.A. Vachudova, ‘National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement’ (2003) East European Politics and Societies 17/1.

[7] R Baldwin, J Francois, R Portes ‘The costs and benefits of Eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and Central Europe’ (1997) Economic Policy, 12/24.

[8] U Sedelmeier ‘Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004-2014’ (2014) <https://eu.boell.org/en/2014/06/10/europe-after-eastern-enlargement-european-union-2004-2014>  accessed 28 June 2024

[9] R Baldwin, J Francois, R Portes ‘The costs and benefits of Eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and Central Europe’ (1997) Economic Policy, 12/24.

[10] Ibid 150.

[11] Ibid 151.

[12] M Wohlgemuth, C Brandi ‘Strategies of flexible integration and enlargement of the European Union’ (2006) No 06/7, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.<https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/aluord/067.html> accessed 1 July 2024.

[13] Ibid.

[14] H Laermans, P Roosens, ‘The enlargement of the European Union’ (2009) Economic Thought and Practice.

[15] S Piedrafita, J Torreblanca, ‘The three logics of EU enlargement: interests, identities and arguments’ (2005) Politique Européenne, 2005 1/15.

[16] Ibid 28.

[17] “Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law; respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; and respect for a pluralistic society and for non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men (Treaty on European Union 2016).

[18] M Wohlgemuth, C Brandi ‘Strategies of flexible integration and enlargement of the European Union’ (2006) No 06/7, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.<https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/aluord/067.html> accessed 1 July 2024

[19] This was the number of member states at the date when the paper was written, although the negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria had been concluded by the end of 2005.

[20] M Wohlgemuth, C Brandi ‘Strategies of flexible integration and enlargement of the European Union’ (2006) No 06/7, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.<https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/aluord/067.html> accessed 1 July 2024

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid 14.

[26] Ibid 5.

[27] Ibid 6.

[28] Ibid 7.

[29] Group of Twelve, ‘Sailing on High Seas: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21^st Century’(2023) < https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/20230919_group_of_twelve_report_updated14.12.2023_cle88fb88.pdf> accessed 17 September 2024

[30] P Buras, E Morina, ‘Catch-27: The Contradictory Thinking about Enlargement in the EU’(2024), < https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/> accessed 19 July 2024

[31] B Lippert, ‘EU Enlargement: Geopolitics Meets Integration Policy’ (2024) <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/eu-enlargement-geopolitics-meets-integration-policy > accessed 19 July 2024

[32] J Tombiriski, ‘The European Union is Better off with Ukraine as a Member’ (2023) <https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/The%20European%20Union%20Is%20Better%20Off%20With%20Ukraine%20policy%20paper.pdf>  accessed 19 July 2024

[33] P Buras, E Morina, ‘Catch-27: The Contradictory Thinking about Enlargement in the EU’(2024), < https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/> accessed 19 July 2024

[34] B Lippert, ‘EU Enlargement: Geopolitics Meets Integration Policy’ (2024) <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/eu-enlargement-geopolitics-meets-integration-policy > accessed 19 July 2024

[35] J Tombiriski, ‘The European Union is Better off with Ukraine as a Member’ (2023) <https://www.globsec.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/The%20European%20Union%20Is%20Better%20Off%20With%20Ukraine%20policy%20paper.pdf>  accessed 19 July 2024

[36] N.a. ‘Treaty on the Relations of Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation between Romania and Ukraine’ (1997) https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/treaty/en-treaty-on-the-relations-of-good-neighbourliness-and-cooperation-between-romania-and-ukraine-with-exchange-of-letters-1997-treaty-on-the-relations-of-good-neighbourliness-and-cooperation-between-romania-and-ukraine-1997-monday-2nd-june-1997> accessed 25 July 2024

[37] M Golubeva et al., ‘European Home for Ukraine: Perspectives on the EU’s Enlargement Challenge from Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw’ (2023) <https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/a-european-home-for-ukraine/> Accessed 19 September 2024

[38] Ibid.

[39] E Macron, ‘Closing speech at the Globsec Summit’ (2023)

[40] Ibid.

[41] M Golubeva et al., ‘European Home for Ukraine: Perspectives on the EU’s Enlargement Challenge from Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw’ (2023) <https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/a-european-home-for-ukraine/> Accessed 19 September 2024

[42] M Emerson, ‘The Potential Impact of Ukrainian Accession on the EU’s Budget and the Importance of Control Valves’ < https://icds.ee/en/the-potential-impact-of-ukrainian-accession-on-the-eus-budget-and-the-importance-of-control-valves/ > accessed 21 July 2024

[43] < https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine/ukraine-facility_en > accessed 21 July 2024

[44] I Neumann, ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus’ (1998) Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 23/3.