The Brussels Brief

Introduction

The European Council is the key decision-making institution of the European Union. The 27 EU heads of state and government meet and provide political guidance to the other institutions in Brussels. This guidance eventually translates into concrete actions and measures, including EU primary and secondary legislation that all member states implement.

 To reach decisions that give the overall direction of the EU in internal and external affairs, the 27 members of the European Council meet as a group to discuss every three months (in theory) or more (in practice) the topics that are part of the agenda of meetings. This chapter, thus, argues that the most critical decision-making institution in the EU, the European Council, is a group of individuals bearing particular characteristics, dynamics and behaviour. To substantiate this, the chapter first defines the characteristics of the group and analyses its structure, the types of intragroup interaction, and the types of interdependence. Interdependence is a common denominator of what a group represents within an organisation (Jex, Britt, 2014). Smaller intragroups formed by Member States within EUCO follow the same objectives. As Jex and Britt (2014) showed, the outcomes of the group depend on each member of the collective. Jex and Britt (2014) also list other critical defining characteristics of a group, such as social interaction and the commonality of purpose. These are all relevant for the case in point of EUCO, where individuals meet, socially interact over the length of the reunions, and have a commonality of purpose: to reach a common decision, a joint common position for the EU. The latter is what they are trying to accomplish collectively, namely, to reach conclusions and adopt the way forward.

The chapter also examines the existing literature on group structure by replicating this to the specific groups represented by EUCO. Several elements are relevant for analysing the group structure: roles, norms, values, communication patterns and status differentials. There are specific roles in EUCO, including that of the dean of the group (and how this links with the role of the leader) and that of the president, as well as those linked with the power representation of each Member State. Status differentials are also linked to roles and power relations within these two groups. Norms can be assimilated into procedures, while some overall norms and values govern the decisions made by these institutions. Through case studies, the chapter examines situations when norms are broken and what happens to the group members (Dentler &Erickson, 1959; Levine et al., 2001). The chapter also looks at communication patterns and discourse elements to describe how EUCO communicates internally and externally. This analysis of group structure leads to a study of group interaction, as reflected in EUCO. This starts from Thomas’s (1976) proposed matrix regarding intergroup interaction that, according to him, depends on the degree of compatibility between the goals of the different groups and the degree to which the groups must interact, respectively. The resulting situations are competition, collaboration, avoidance, accommodation, and compromise. The chapter aims to reflect on these negotiation situations within EUCO and explain how various forms of intragroup behaviour occur.

The current literature proposes several studies that deal with the functioning of EUCO. Some are constructed as an introductory handbook to the functioning of the EU and, in this context, provide a presentation of the interaction between institutions in the decision-making process. In this category, one can include books such as “the Oxford Handbook of the European Union” (Jones, Menon, Weatherill, 2012), “The European Union Decides” (Thomson et al., 2009), “How the EU Institutions Work” (Akse, 2020), “Understanding the European Union” (McCormick, 2020). Some books regarding EU institutions and the decision-making process go into more detail. They are more focused on the factors that impact the policy process (Versluis, van Keulen, Stephenson, 2010), as well as on aspects related to governance (Sabel, Zeitlin, 2012). At the same time, others propose a comprehensive perspective as regards the EU. For example, Lelieveldt and Princen (2023) use the tools of comparative politics to explore the history, theories, institutions, key actors, politics, and policymaking of the EU. Some books regarding EU institutions were explicitly developed to cover certain institutions, such as EUCO. The categorisation is like the one presented previously. Some, such as Westlake et al. (2003), favour a more general, descriptive approach, covering elements such as the legal basis, composition and preparation and process (de Schoutheete, Wallace, 2002), while others (Wessels, 2015) go into more detail and the books encourage an in-depth understanding of each institution. Some works provide an analysis of a particular aspect related to one of the institutions, such as Tallberg’s analysis of the bargaining power in EUCO (2007) or the role of agenda-shaping in decision-making (Tallberg, 2003).

The primary purpose of this chapter is to analyse decision-making in EUCO as it relates to group dynamics and group behaviour. The premise is that the EUCO is a group of individuals representing the heads of state and government of the 27 EU Member States. As such, EUCO, as a group, has many of the characteristics one recognises universally in other groups, such as the elements of the group structure. Furthermore, the group comprises various smaller groups, which is best reflected during negotiations on multiple topics. Depending on the issues discussed, member states, represented by their elected presidents or prime ministers, group themselves in discussions, following similar group objectives and aiming to obtain a compromise solution as close to their position as possible. Previous literature has focussed on EUCO and its functionality as a European institution. This chapter, however, aims to take a different investigative approach and look at EUCO as a group with its characteristics, structure, dynamics, and behaviour.

This analysis is divided into three main sections. First, we look at the characteristics of EUCO as a group, focusing on its interdependence, perception of the group, and commonality of purpose. Subsequently, we discuss the structure of EUCO as a group and aspects such as roles, norms, and communication patterns. Finally, we also discuss types of intergroup interaction, focusing on negotiation as the main instrument of communication to reach a compromise solution. These theoretical considerations are then exemplified in two case studies, dealing with negotiations regarding the Multiannual Financial Framework and Ukraine’s candidature to join the EU.

Theoretical considerations: EUCO as a group

Definitions of what a group is vary. Interdependence is an essential element that transforms a collection of people into a group (Jex, Britt, 2008). Interdependence means that the potential outcomes of the group are based on the different participation and interaction of the members and that, in various ways, individuals’ actions will affect the group’s performance. Forsyth (2009) also points out the intrinsic connections between the group members, which are essential for outcomes and determine specific actions, feelings, or experiences between members. At the same time, he also shows that interdependence is not necessarily equal in the group. In a unilateral interdependence, one member of the group influences others. In sequential interdependence, one member influences another, who, in turn, influences the next (for example, when it comes to an assembly line activity, where each worker needs to complete his part of the work before the other can do his). Reciprocal but unequal interdependence is also a particular situation. These are all relevant for the empirical analysis because EUCO’s complex and dynamic nature allows all these dependencies to manifest themselves at different moments. These variations will depend on the discussed topic, the formation of the institution and its members, which changes regularly, and external dynamics such as foreign policy developments.

Social interaction is another characteristic of a group, and it refers to “verbal and nonverbal communication” (Jex, Britt, 2008). However, relevant to EUCO meetings, various determinants can affect social interaction, including intensity, seating arrangements, communication patterns, or controllability (Forsyth, 2009). A third defining characteristic is the internal and external perception of being a group, also closely linked to entitativity. Forsyth (2009) defined this concept, referring to Campbell (1958), as “the extent to which an assemblage of individuals is perceived to be a group rather than an aggregation of independent, unrelated individuals”. Finally, the last characteristic of groups is the commonality of purpose. This means the group aims to collectively accomplish an objective (Jex, Britt, 2008). The group has some common objectives on which they are working to achieve.  In the case of EUCO, meetings can be formal or informal. Still, the result is the same: the meetings take place to discuss topics of interest for the EU and to reach decisions on these particular subjects. The purpose is to translate these group characteristics to EUCO and determine how these operate in this particular case. The first essential characteristic that defines EUCO as a group is its interdependence. Several elements reflect this. The members of EUCO have a common objective: to provide political guidance for the European Union. Art.15(1) of the Treaty on the EU describes this broadly. Still, the main objective of EUCO is to provide strategic and political direction for the EU’s future development and actions.

The interdependence is also reflected in Art. 15(4). Decisions in EUCO are taken by consensus. There is no effective voting, but the European Leaders comment, objecting when they disagree until a compromise is reached. If this is not the case or not possible, the decision is deferred to another reunion. In critical cases, such as adopting the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the EU’s budget, the Heads of State or Government will remain in meetings as long as necessary to reach the needed consensus. In line with the general acceptance in the EU, even in cases where unanimity is not the voting rule, consensus, namely the understanding that all member states agree with a solution, remains the preferred way forward. This is even more the case for EUCO, where its members represent the executive leadership of their member states. Given this, the interdependence between the members of EUCO becomes even more evident. The 27 members of EUCO, its President and the President of the Commission need to work together to achieve a consensus. When this is not possible, solutions need to be found among the members, and this can only be done through interaction, both in the official, formal sessions and in informal meetings on the margins. Derogation is sometimes a solution that can be identified. In December 2019, EU leaders endorsed the objective of making the EU climate-neutral by 2050, in line with the Paris Agreement. One member state, Poland, could not commit to this objective, so leaders had to return to the issue in June 2020.

Regarding the internal and external perception as a group, EUCO is seen by all outside actors and individuals as a group of 27 heads of state and government representing one of the 27 member states of the European Union. They perceive the group as such. This results less from the personal individual in that particular member state position for some time and more from the institutional framework defined by the EU Treaties. According to these, each member state is allocated a seat in EUCO. The head of state or government sits in that seat when he has this national capacity. The projection is thus less on the individual as a member of the group and more on a transposition that the individual changes, but the position as such remains inside the group. Some elements that come with that particular member state’s elements as part of group characteristics will remain unchanged. In contrast, those personal ones will be reflected in some respects, such as social influence.

Regarding the commonality of purpose, this concept reflects that the group aims to accomplish an objective collectively. Previously, we have shown that EUCO gives political guidance regarding the way forward for the EU. What this means in practice is that EUCO invites other institutions (this is generally the polite term used in EUCO Conclusions as opposed to actual tasking) to go forward with particular legislation, to adopt specific policies, to look into ways that relations with a third country can be further developed etc. This commonality of purpose means that EUCO guides the EU in the short, medium, and long term, and fundamentally, it reflects that EUCO is the main decision-making body of the EU.

Group structures in EUCO

The group structure is a “set of dimensions along which any group can be described” (Jex, Britt, 2008). This section will focus on roles, norms, values, communication patterns and status differentials. Roles are “coherent sets of behaviours expected of people in specific positions within a group or social setting” (Forsyth, 2009). As such, roles are more than tasks that individuals assume or assign within the group; they are also about how individuals act about these tasks and how they interact with other participants in the group. At the same time, while the set of behaviours is generally well-defined, it is not strict. Forsyth (2009) presents an excellent example of the actor’s role in a play. While the role is defined by some general coordinates, such as what defines Juliet in a play, it is up to the actor to adapt to tone, recitation, and overall performance. This similarly happens in the group. 

Roles generally come about in the process of role differentiation. This starts with the conclusion that the group can be more efficient in achieving its objectives if people do different things than the entire group performing the same activity. All groups have a leader figure, which provides the overall coordination of the group’s activity and ensures that this goes towards a final positive goal. This can often be either formal (the President of EUCO is the formal leader of the group) or informal (the Dean of EUCO, for example, is the head of state or government that has been longest present in EUCO and benefits from an informal leadership of the process). The leader figure generally joins other persons in the group that revolve around a task role: organising the group, providing expertise in a specific direction, giving opinions, and providing evaluations. The task role is one of the typologies Benne and Sheats (1948) proposed. The other two roles are the socio-emotional role or the relationship role, which aims to “satisfy the emotional needs of the members” (Forsyth, 2009), and the individual roles, generally those who stand out from the group in terms of their objectives its involvement, its socialisation.

In EUCO, roles are linked to tasks the members of EUCO need to fulfil. In principle, each of the members of this group has two tasks: (1) defend the interests of the member state in the group, as endorsed by voters in national elections and by various other national stakeholders, and (2) defend the interests of the EU and ensure that the negotiations and discussions as related to point 1 lead to decisions and conclusions that are in that note. As such, the members of EUCO already attend all the meetings, fulfilling a role that stays the same for the duration during which they still have this national role before the next election. Their role is the head of state or government of one of the member states. The other roles that are filled are that of the President of EUCO and that of the President of the European Commission, as per Art. 15(2), that has been discussed previously. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes part in the meetings of EUCO and, as such, he has an assigned role as well (other than attending), which is, upon request of the members, to brief on particular situations or developments regarding his area of action and competence. In EUCO, some roles are fixed, and some depend on the tasks at hand, namely on the topics under discussion and on which some of the members can provide more elements given the interests of the member state in a specific topic. Some fixed roles include the president, the dean and the agenda setter. The President of EUCO has the role of convening and chairing EUCO meetings. It is not a leadership role but rather a primus inter pares. His informal role is, however, much more complex: by chairing the meetings, his role is to guide the discussion towards consensus, to obtain solutions, sometimes also through informal sessions on the margin of the official reunion, and to aim for a favourable resolution of the discussion.

Sometimes, more than the President of EUCO is needed for this and the informal role of guiding the discussions towards a successful completion is taken by someone with influence in the group. This could be the dean of EUCO, but this is not always enough. The former German Chancellor Merkel had served without interruption for the past 15 years as the German Chancellor and has represented Germany in this capacity at EUCO reunions. This type of experience in EUCO had a distinct impact on her expertise as a negotiator and compromise seeker in the group. Her expertise on files, such as the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), where she had been previously engaged in negotiations for the 2021-2027 cycle and the previous MFF cycles starting with 2005, and her representing Germany only increased her clout. Without taking over the President’s role, she could help forge a compromise on complex negotiations. Some members of EUCO, such as Prime Minister Orban, are veto players. For Tsebelis, veto players with greater control over the possibilities to replace the status quo are labelled agenda setters (Tsebelis 2002, p. 13). In this role, Prime Minister Orban blocked a consensus on opening accession negotiations with Ukraine. Depending on the task/topic discussed during the meetings, there are also examples of temporary roles, such as the role of the influencer. The interest of a member state in a topic can give that member of EUCO a temporary influencing role in shaping discussions. When EUCO discusses Turkey, for example, the expertise of the Cypriot members gives it particular importance, as these members will be able to influence discussions. In terms of the task or topic being discussed, there are also thematic roles in EUCO, such as, for example, the human rights defenders (heads of state and government that take a keener interest in this subject and, as such, their interventions include elements regarding the protection of human rights) or climate promoters.

Another dimension relevant to group structure is group norms. Norms are “emergent, consensual standards that regulate group members’ behaviours” (Forysth, 2009). The key word is ‘regulate’, while the complementary ones are ‘emergent’ and ‘consensual’. Norms regulate the group’s activity, the interaction between the members, and how the individuals participate. They define what is appropriate, as well as what is prohibited. They are also emergent because they are not imposed outside the group but constructed through the members’ interaction and eventual compromise-building. They are also consensual because, in principle, they are accepted by all group members. As for norms as part of the group structure of EUCO, two categories can be identified: formalised and informal. Both categories of norms have the same role: to regulate the group’s functioning. The formalised norms are laid down in EUCO Rules of Procedure, which EUCO adopted through a Decision of 1 December 2009[1]. These formalised norms regulate the place of meeting (in Brussels. Only exceptionally, the President of EUCO, with the agreement of the General Affairs Council or the Committee of Permanent Representatives, acting unanimously, may decide that a meeting of EUCO will be held elsewhere), the frequency of meetings (twice every six months, convened by its President. When the situation requires, a special meeting can be convened) and the way decisions are taken (by consensus, except where the Treaties provide otherwise). The Rules of Procedure also reflect the norms regarding the preparation of EUCO, including how the agenda is defined and adopted, and even norms regarding the total size of the delegations authorised to have access to the building where the meeting of EUCO is held (20 persons for each member state and the Commission, and to five for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.). An important norm is also that the meetings of EUCO are not public (although Politico, the famed information instrument of Brussels, is always able to present what the leaders are eating for dinner[2], but also how discussions evolve in their live blog during the reunions[3]). The informal norms are not laid down or adopted but are known to the members, who act upon them in their meetings to reach decisions. These complement the formalised norms and permit the proper works of the reunion, facilitating consensus. One such norm is that, for example, when blockages occur regarding the reunion’s outcome, the group members may have informal meetings in smaller groups to try and work out differences. Another informal norm is that meetings regarding foreign policy are generally held over dinner in a classified environment. When one of the members of EUCO leaves the group, it is usually the dean of the group that has a farewell speech.

These different roles and how they develop within the group, depending on the impact on achieving the group’s objectives and other factors, lead to status differentials, another dimension of group structure that will be briefly described. As Jex and Britt (2008) point out, there are two large categories of status differentials: diffuse status characteristics and task-specific status characteristics. The former is not strictly or directly related to the group’s task. The examples given refer, for instance, to societies in which professional occupations such as medicine are awarded a higher status than manual labour. At the same time, logically, status in the group is also granted, given the individual’s impact on the task’s achievement. Citing also Strodtbeck and Lipinski (1985), Jex and Britt highlight that an individual is likely to have a higher status in the group if his contribution is more significant.

Status differentials lead to various consequences. One example is a different reward level for the individual perceived as contributing more to the group’s activity. Another is linked to respect for the norms. Higher status in the group potentially allows for greater derogation from the group’s standards. Citing Hollander (1971) and Britt (2008) refer to idiosyncrasy credits. Like financial credits, these are banked and can be used by group members whenever they need to break a norm. In EUCO, status differentials are linked to influence in the group. It is both given by status characteristics, such as the aggregate structural power of the member state that the head of state or government represents, but also by task-specific elements, such as the knowledge of the topic, the social Klout of the member of EUCO and the diffuse influence he or she can exercise within the group. Evidence shows that while all EUCO members are equal, interdependence is not equal in this group. Tallberg (2007) notes that each leader carries the same weight in EUCO, given the principle of consensus in the decision-making process. However, the difference is in the influence a leader can exercise during negotiations to produce an outcome that reflects his or her starting negotiating position most closely. This influence and member state bargaining power in EUCO is captured, according to Tallberg (2007), by three dimensions: state sources of energy, institutional sources of power and individual sources of power.

Tallberg’s description of aggregate structural power derives from realist theory, which proposes that aggregate structural power results from the respective state’s resources and capabilities. Population, economy, governance, and political stability are components of aggregate structural power. The general assumption proposed by realist theory and Tallberg reflects positioning and the relationship with other member states in defending the respective positions. Member states with greater aggregate structural power will have greater bargaining power and can manoeuvre negotiations towards a compromise closer to their starting negotiating position. Translating this to EUCO, member states with more considerable aggregate weight can better support their negotiating mandate, push for a successful solution, and use various tactics, such as tabling their proposal in the lack of an institutional one. Tallberg is also keen to reflect that state sources of power are not solely formed of aggregate structural power but also of issue-specific power, which tends to balance the bargaining framework more. He argues that if a member state’s resources are sufficiently concentrated on one particular issue, this could cover the existing gap in terms of aggregate structural power, permitting smaller and medium member states to gain in negotiations on these specific issues. Issue-specific power and influence are reflected in the higher commitment and higher stakes of a member state on a particular problem that allows that state to try to obtain the most out of the negotiations.

Tallberg divides the institutional sources of power into two categories: the power of the veto and the power of the chair. Each reflects roles in EUCO, so these sources will be discussed when referring to these roles.

Individual sources of power strongly affect the influence of EUCO members. Tallberg considers personal authority and expertise to be the two elements that could impact member states’ bargaining power. Personal authority is a synergy of various components, such as seniority, personal trust, and personal relations with the other leaders in EUCO. As a complementary comment to Tallberg’s studies, seniority also reflects political success in the respective Member states, showing that the respective leader’s repeated presence in EUCO results from his or her success in national elections. In Brussels, this is an important matter, as well as aspects such as the political families that form the European Parliament and of which the leaders and their respective parties are part.  Aspects of seniority and additional qualities that form personal authority are also critical individual power sources.

Tallberg also highlights expertise as one element that shapes individual power. Often, negotiations at EUCO are also related to technical subjects and require technical expertise to process these. Perhaps no example is so clear as the EU budget or the Multiannual Financial Framework. A higher technical understanding of some of these aspects increases leaders’ negotiating and bargaining power in EUCO meetings since they can discuss in more detail and in a more informed manner. Information is an instrument of power that balances the weight of smaller and medium Member states in EUCO negotiations.

Tallberg highlighted two primary sources of power: personal authority and expertise. A past member of EUCO, Angela Merkel, embodied both these qualities and, complementary to other factors, wielded the most significant influence in EUCO. Others benefit from being former ministers in various fields with increased sectorial expertise.

What Forsyth (2009) labels as a social influence – “interpersonal processes that produce, sometimes directly, but often very subtly and indirectly, changes in other people” – is less critical in the decision-making process in EUCO. Social influence is generally based on peer pressure and the capacity to change the decisions of others in the group in this manner. The members of EUCO are less prone to this type of influence. This is in principle because of their political influence, having been elected in nationwide elections and, as such, representing the interests of their member state. The influence and the way this is propagated in EUCO is much more diffuse and complex, with the overall intention of reaching a consensus within the group. Concessions are sometimes minimal, and negotiating positions are sometimes immovable precisely because of the numerous national stakeholders and the responsibility the leaders have towards them.

However, even leaders will tend to look at those in the group they perceive as having more influence. Compromise may sometimes be acceptable around a general direction towards which such a leader with influence (or a group of leaders) could aim. This compromise would generally not be the same as any of the positions but represent a way forward. Sometimes, social influence complements the other forms of influence discussed, allowing an otherwise smaller member state to increase its influence within the group, notwithstanding its aggregate power. Former Prime Minister of Luxemburg, J.P. Juncker, was well known for punching higher than the aggregate power of the member state he represented. His social influence combined institutional knowledge, sectorial and economic knowledge (he has served as the Minister of Finance in Luxemburg and President of the Eurogroup), and social presence in the group. By 2013, he was also the longest-serving head of any national government in the EU.

Forsyth (2009) also mentions the concept of conformity in the context of majority influence. This means that people tend to agree to something if many others in the group follow the same idea to avoid standing out. This seldom happens in EUCO. The political background of the leaders and their role as elected representatives of member states limit this possibility. The example given previously, with Prime Minister Orban, is eloquent. There was no intention of conformity on his side when the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine was discussed. He preferred to leave the room, allow the decision to be made and return for the rest of the points on the agenda of discussions. In Nail, MacDonald, & Levy’s model (2000), the Hungarian Prime Minister can be labelled as an independent: he disagreed with the group before the discussion (as he publicly expressed on many occasions) and disagreed openly and privately with the group after each debate. His opinion cannot be changed; his standards and positions are clear.

Communication patterns or networks are another way a group can be described. These regular patterns determine how the information is exchanged between the group members. The type of communication pattern varies depending on the number of persons in the network and the centrality of one of the positions. As such, a communication network with a high degree of centrality is the hub-and-spokes model (Shaw, 1964), which plays one position in the middle of the communication channels. Decentralised channels include the “Comcon”, where information moves back and forth between the members of a pentashaped network. As Forsyth (2009) points out, citing Leavitt (1951), the type of communication pattern also provides information about role attribution in the respective group. For example, a hub-and-spokes model, with a high degree of centrality, would tend to reflect that the leader is the core communicator and is placed in the middle of the model. Similarly, those away from the central communicator are likely to play marginal roles in the model and, simultaneously, have a higher chance of leaving the group because of more limited access to information.

In EUCO, communication patterns are not easy to reflect on because of their specific characteristics. It is a centralised structure, like the wheel communication pattern. However, the wheel pattern is described as everybody talking to the central person of the group but not talking among themselves. This differs from the communication model that EUCO proposes. It could thus be assimilated also to a Comcon (a decentralised structure), but with a central person who plays the hub position role, which is to “use the hub position as the data processing centre, and its occupant typically collects information, synthesises it, and then sends it back to others” (Forsyth, 2009). This hub position belongs to the President of EUCO because his role in managing the reunions also involves guiding discussions towards consensus, obtaining and disseminating information from other participants, observing where the compromise could be achieved and, eventually, concluding the meeting on these lines. The other members of EUCO attend the reunions and intervene on the various topics of discussion, thus interacting during the formal parts of the reunions. They also have complementary and informal talks between themselves in various bigger or smaller groups.

EUCO communicates both formally and informally. It communicates to the public and other institutions through its EUCO Conclusions. These provide general political guidance, meaning that through its Conclusions, EUCO tasks the other institutions to undertake various measures to advance with different objectives. Each EUCO member communicates separately from the group through press statements, interviews (upon arrival and at the end of the reunions), etc. In general, this communication is for the internal audience and explains the positioning during the meetings and how this defended national preferences. Informally, members of EUCO meet regularly on the margins of meetings, thematically related to the political family or when they belong to geographical groups (for example, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic occasionally meet as the V4 on the margins of important EUCO, such as those discussing climate or the multiannual budget).   These different roles and how they develop within the group, depending on the impact on achieving the group’s objectives and other factors, lead to status differences, another dimension of group structure that will be briefly described. As Jex and Britt (2008) point out, there are two large categories of status differentials: diffuse status characteristics and task-specific status characteristics. The former is not strictly or directly related to the group’s task. The examples given refer, for instance, to societies in which professional occupations such as medicine are awarded a higher status than manual labour. At the same time, logically, status in the group is also granted, given the individual’s impact on achieving the task. Citing also Strodtbeck and Lipinski (1985), Jex and Britt highlight that an individual is likely to have a higher status in the group if his contribution is more significant.

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[1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32009D0882

[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/eat-pray-summit-whats-on-eu-leaders-plates/

[3] https://www.politico.eu/article/live-blog-european-council-summit-23-march-2023/